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NOEL T. DOWLING*
To put the conclusion of the matter at the beginning, I believe it
is in order to say that the general problem of the maintenance of the
federal system, including the special problem of state taxation of multiple
business with which this symposium is concerned, has all but become
political in character and that the ultimate answers will have to come
from Congress rather than the Supreme Court. This seems to me to be
the composite, and salutary, result of more than a century of litigation
over the adjustment of state and national power in the operation of the
federal system.
The constitutional story which runs through that litigation is fasci-
nating, even if sometimes bewildering. It hangs chiefly, not wholly, on
the commerce clause. There is no need to tell more of it here than
enough to indicate the trend and sweep of the development on the two
major aspects -of the clause, namely, as a grant of power to Congress
and as a source of limitation on the powers of the States. Both parts of
the story start with a single case in 1824 and, curiously enough, reach
their climax in cases only three years apart in the 1940's.
As for the power of Congress, the story runs its course from Gibbons
v. Ogden1 to Wickard v. Filburn.' John Marshall may not have had a
gift of prophecy, but surely he could write for the future. "The genius
and character of the whole government seem to be [he said in Gibbons],
that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation,
and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not
to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not
affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for
the purpose of exerting some of the general powers of the government."
That formula, superimposed on what had been said in McCtdloch v.
Maryland' about implied powers, gave Congress a green light for the
expansion of national power. But I do not read Gibbons v. Ogden as a
judicial intimation of uncontrolled-or at all events, only politically
controlled-discretion in Congress to determine the bounds of its own
delegated powers. On the contrary, I read it as pre-supposing judicially
ascertained constitutional limitations on that power. Yet, with Hammer
v. Dagenharts4 "departure" from principle having been corrected by the
overruling of that case in United States v. Darby,5 the judicial trend has
been towards leaving the scope of Congressional power to Congress'
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1 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (Wheat.) 1 (1824).
2 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
3 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (Wheat.) 316 (1819).
4 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
5 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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judgment and responsibility. So marked has been this trend that in Wick-
ard v. Filburn, sustaining national regulation of minor details of agri-
cultural production in the States, the Court thought it worthwhile to
sound a warning that "effective restraints" on the exercise of the com-
merce power "must proceed from political rather than from judicial
processes." And for that warning, it must be said, the Court did find
some support in Gibbons v. Ogden.' All the same, Wickard is not a
holding that the question is political or that judicial review has been
renounced. Actually the Court went into the merits and concluded that
the subject matter there controlled had, potentially at least, a substantial
effect upon the interstate market. As the arbiter of Congressional power,
then, the Court continues in a standby position. On the present outlook,
however, the chances are small that any regulation enacted by Congress
will be upset as an invasion of state powers. The Tenth Amendment,
once thought to have an operative effect of its own, is now "but a
truism." Congress is in full control at the national end of the interstate
problem.
Congress' control is even more firmly fixed with respect to what
the States can do. Here the course of the story runs from Gibbons v.
Ogden to Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona.7 I take these as land-
mark cases, despite the fact that the actual decision in neither of them
touches the point under present consideration and that each deals with
regulation as compared to taxation. The overtone of Gibbons v. Ogden
was that the boundaries of state power are fixed by the Constitution and
are to be ascertained by the Court.' That continued to be true until
Cooley v. Board of Wardens,9 when the idea of an "authoritative" voice
in Congress began to assume a conspicuous place in the Court's exposi-
tion."° Since then the divisions in the Court, often and sharp, have come
0 The reference is to this fragment of Marshall's opinion: "The wisdom and
the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which
their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as
that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied
to secure them from its abuse." Gibbons v. Ogden, supra at p. 197.
7 Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
8 "It has been contended by the Counsel for the appellant, that, as the word
'to regulate' implies in its nature, full power over the thing regulated, it excludes,
necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same operation on the
same thing." There is, said Marshall, "great force" in the argument, and "the
Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted." Gibbons v. Ogden, supra at p. 209.
9 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (How.) 299 (1851).
10 "The Act of 1789 [consenting to state regulation of pilots] contains a clear
and authoritative declaration by the first Congress, that the nature of this subject
is such, that until Congress should find it necessary to exert its power, it should
be left to the legislation of the States * * 0"
"Viewed in this light, so much of this Act of 1789 as declares that pilots
shall continue to be regulated 'by such laws as the States may respectively here-
after enact for that purpose,' instead of being held inoperative, as an attempt to
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largely on the role of the Court in the silence of Congress. It is now
accepted that, absent Congressional action, the Court is the arbiter of
the validity of state laws impinging on interstate commerce, and that
the Court makes its decision on a balancing of national and local inter-
ests."1 But where Congress has given expression to its will whether state
laws shall or shall not prevail, an unbroken line of cases supports the
authority of the Congressional voice. Chief Justice Stone summed the
law up in Southern Pacific: "Congress has undoubted power to redefine
the distribution of power over interstate commerce. It may either permit
the States to regulate the commerce in a manner which would otherwise
not be permissible, . . . or exclude state regulation even of matters of
peculiarly local concern which nevertheless affect interstate commerce."
So much for the regulatory power of the States and the dominant voice
of Congress.
Tax cases seem, to be taken by the Court as presenting a different
situation. Though here the Court also acts as arbiter in the absence of
Congressional action, not much is heard of the balancing-of-interests proc-
ess of Southern Pacific or of the familiar national-local-interests formula
of Cooky. To be sure, something comparable seemed to be developing
in Mr. Stone's thinking when he began to talk in terms of a "practical
judgment" as to the effect of state taxes on interstate commerce. 2 At any
rate the trend was away from the position that interstate commerce
"cannot be taxed at all" towards the point that interstate commerce
"must pay its way." Whatever the trend, it seems to have come to a halt
with Mr. Stone's passing from the scene.
13
But even if there be a difference in the Court's role in the two
classes of cases where Congress has not acted, I see no reason to doubt
that the pronouncement in Southern Pacific holds good for taxation as
well as for regulation. Certainly, Mr. Stone made no distinction in his
description of Congressional power. As a matter of fact it was in con-
nection with tax cases-those having to do with inter-governmental
immunities-that he did much of the development of his ideas about the
confer on the States a power to legislate, of which the Constitution had deprived
them, is allowed an appropriate and important signification."
Id at p. 319.
11Thus, "the matters for ultimate determination here are the nature and
extent of the burden which the state regulation of interstate trains, adopted as a
safety measure, imposes on interstate commerce, and whether the relative weights
of the state and national interests involved are such as to make inapplicable the
rule, generally observed, that the free flow of interstate commerce and its freedom
from local restraints in matters requiring uniformity of regulation are interests
safeguarded by the commerce clause from state interference." Southern Pacific
supra, at p. 770.
12For example in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 309 U.S. 33
(1940).
13 See Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes in Interstate Transactions, 47 Col. L.
Rev. 211 (1947).
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mutual accommodation of national and state interests. As early as 1926,
within a year after he came to the Court, Mr. Stone began, in Metcalf
& Eckly v. Mitchell 4, to whittle away at the base and scope of the im-
munity enjoyed by one government as against taxation by the other. And
in 1938 he spoke for the Court in formulating the rule of Helvering v.
Gerhardt5 that state taxation of federal instrumentalities is dependent,
not on a requirement of the Constitution, but on the intention of
Congress. 6 In the Helvering opinion he stated the power of Congress
over state taxation of federal instrumentalities in the same way that six
years later in Southern Pacific he phrased the power over state regulation
of commerce. Thus in Helvering: "Congress may curtail an immunity
which might otherwise be implied, . . . or enlarge it beyond the point
where, Congress being silent, the Court would set its limits." But the
carry-over of the rule of Southern Pacific to taxation does not depend
on further analogy or argument; Prudential Insurance Company v.
Benjamin'" supplied any needed authority. There the Court sustained
an Act of Congress giving permission to the States to impose a tax on
interstate business which the Court assumed (without deciding) would
otherwise have been invalid. The case for power in Congress to recon-
cile National and State powers over commerce appears to be beyond
dispute.
And there is a tolerably clear case for the exercise of that power.
It has been said, for example, that Congress alone can consider whether
a given tax "is consistent with the best interests of our national economy"
and, on the basis of a full exploration of the many aspects of the com-
plicated problem, "devise a national policy fair alike to the States and
our Union."'" Doubts have been expressed on many sides whether the
judicial process is adequate to the task in hand.' 9 Certainly no shining
success has attended the efforts up to this time. Even if it were possible
for the Supreme Court to stretch the judicial process so as to overcome
some of the defects of the "hit-and-miss method" of deciding single
local controversies upon evidence limited by the narrow rules of litiga-
14Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926).
'1Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
16 Thus, "in considering the immunity of federal instrumentalities from state
taxation two factors may be of importance which are lacking in the case of a
claimed immunity of state instrumentalities from federal taxation. Since the acts
of Congress within its constitutional power are supreme, the validity of state
taxation of federal instrumentalities must depend (a) on the power of Congress
to create the instrumentality and (b) its intent to protect it from taxation . .
Id. at p. 411, fn.
17Prudential Insurance Company v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
18 Justices Black, Frankfurter and Douglas, dissenting, in McCarroll v.
Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 189 (1940).
19 See, A Suggested Approach, in HARTMAN, STATE TAXATIoN OF INTERSTATE
COM MERCE, 1953, p. 275.
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tion,2" the main result would be that the Court had merely come closer
to the legislative way of doing the job. The preferable method, as it
seems to me, is for Congress to recognize the problem as essentially
legislative in character and to take it up for remedial action.
There are, of course, differences of opinion whether Congress
should do anything at all; and, if so, what. No doubt--at least so I
hope--some of the principal papers to follow will deal with these
phases of the matter. My part in the present enterprise is mainly to help
provide a constitutional background and to offer any incidental sugges-
tions which may seem appropriate for Congressional action. As to the
latter, I would welcome the enactment of a law exhibiting and built
around three major features: (1) establishment of a substantive rule
against state taxation which unreasonably interferes with the national
interests in commerce; (2). creation of an administrative agency for
effectuating the substantive rule; and (3) postponement of the operative
date of the substantive rule for at least six months, possibly a year.
By the way of comment, the first thing to be said is that no new
departure in the law would be involved in the adoption of the suggested
substantive rule. Indeed, a rule to that effect has already come to be law
in the Supreme Court. That, as I see it, is the result of the long line of
cases on the commerce clause. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that the
result has come about through a combination of action by the Court and
acquiescence by Congress. Congress, as Chief Justice Stone pointed out
in Southern Pacific, "has left it to the courts to formulate the rules" in
respect of state action impinging on commerce and "has accommodated
its legislation to those rules." More specifically to the point is Mr. Justice
Black's statement in Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen,2 ' that the judicial
interpretation of the commerce clause has "gradually evolved the principle
that non-action by Congress is tantamount to a Congressional declaration
that the flow of commerce from State to State must be free from unfair
and discriminatory burdens." Despite variations in the terms employed
by the Court the judicial efforts have the common aim of building up a
barrier for the protection of national interests in commerce against un-
reasonable state interference. It will be observed in the above quotation
that Mr. Black takes the view that the barrier depends upon a "Con-
gressional declaration" somehow derived from non-action by Congress.
Mr. Stone left open the question whether it comes from "implications
of the commerce clause itself" or the "presumed intention of Congress."322
Not much need be said about the creation of an administrative agency
20 See footnote 18, supra.
21 Adams Manufacturing Company v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
22 At p. 768 of Southern Pacific, supra. To me, as I have indicated in
Interstate Commerce and State Poqer-Revised P'ersion, 47 Col. L. Rev. 546, 559
(1947), the barrier is better described as a form of national common law developed
by the Court for the governance of the States in an area, commerce, where
Congress has unquestioned power to prescribe the applicable statute law.
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for effectuating the substantive rule. We have long since become accus-
tomed to such agencies as useful, if not sometimes indispensable, means
of bringing special talents and procedures into the development and
administration of the law. in new and complicated areas. The delegated
function of making subsidiary regulations should be of particular value
here since in its exercise the agency would be able to supply what the
courts are not geared to give and what would involve Congress itself
in an excess of detail.
Postponement of the effective date of the substantive rule could
produce beneficial results. It would cushion the impact of the rule on
the States and other interested parties. It would afford the members of
the newly created agency a period of grace to inquire into and reflect
upon their assigned task in preparation for the days of hard decisions
just ahead.
